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Abstract: 
Migrant and labor issues are a primary concern in the Arab Gulf countries. With focus 
on the economic and political conditions that influence actors’ decisions when framing 
labor policies, this study analyzes how preferences of such policies are formed and 
explains why the governments of the Arab Gulf countries attempt to implement less 
economical policies. The findings suggest that governments avoid concessions for 
enterprises required to implement more economical policies and chose uneconomical 
ones to maintain authoritarian regimes.  
 
Key Words: 
labor market, migration, authoritarianism, Arab Gulf countries 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Arab Gulf countries (hereinafter AGCs)1 house a significantly large 
number of migrants, which often exceeds the native population. In fact, migrants 
account for the highest proportion of workforces in all the AGCs (Table 1). 
Unfortunately, the rapid population growth of nationals has brought new entrants into 
the labor market, causing labor problems. Thus, there has been an increasing need in the 
recent decades to control the inflow of migrants and create new jobs for nationals; 
however, almost all attempts show no positive results. Many studies have predicted such 
unemployment issues and attributed them to the inefficient nature of labor policies. 
Why have the governments of the AGCs failed to control the labor market and decrease 
                                                 
1 Here, the Arab Gulf countries (AGCs) include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
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the unemployment of nationals?  
This study attempts to explain how this ineffectiveness occurs. Although the 
governments of the AGCs chose measures rationally, many scholars criticize on the 
grounds of being ineffective. Moreover, disregard of the AGCs’ economic and political 
conditions that influence actors’ decisions have led to their labor market policies being 
misunderstood. Focusing on conditions typical to the AGCs, such as enormous oil 
wealth, authoritarianism, and vast migrant workers, this study analyzes the preference 
of labor policies and explains them as rationally formed outcomes. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
hypothesis that explains the preference of labor policies in the AGCs. Section 3 
analyzes this hypothesis by referencing the historical realities of the AGCs’ labor 
markets. Section 4 discusses the reasons underpinning the governments’ decisions to 
implement uneconomical measures. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypothesis 
 
To study the process of how preferences are formed regarding the 
implementation of certain policies, it is necessary to consider actors that shape these 
preferences and the conditions that influence actors’ decisions. Generally, in democratic 
countries, there are four actors: governments and the mass, the former must hear the 
voice of the latter to win an election; political elites who support and then influence the 
government; and enterprises that influence the implementation of economic policies. In 
comparison to democratic countries, the political process in the AGCs is completely 
different. The AGCs function under authoritarian regimes that restrict the political 
participation of these actors, and hence, the governments tend less to hear their voices. 
As for economic and political conditions, it is important to focus on 
conditions that have shaped the basic features of the political economy in the AGCs. 
The economic growth in the AGCs can be attributed to the development of the oil 
industry. This economic structure influenced the components of human resources, 
resulting in present labor market problem in the AGCs. In general, the size of a 
country’s economy develops along with that of its domestic economic activity. However, 
in the AGCs, the size of each country’s economy grew beyond that of domestic 
economic activities, along with exogenous capital inflows generated by oil export. This 
inevitably led to labor shortage, a problem that was then resolved by importing migrant 
workers. Until now, since the size of the AGCs’ economies has been larger than that of 
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domestic economic activities, the Gulf economy could not manage without migrant 
workers. 
Politically, all the AGCs function under authoritarian governments. In some 
countries, such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE, the parliaments are formed 
through elections; however, since they do not have parliamentary democracy, the 
governments have little incentive to cater to the masses2. On the other hand, countries 
such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar do not hold elections to form parliaments. They are, as 
indicated in M. Herb (1999), dynastic monarchy. In these countries, royal families 
constitute the main body of each government and attempt to occupy political power. 
They do not want concession to any other actors outside their family, such as enterprises 
and citizens because such concession may invite their participation in the 
decision-making process, and this is harmful for authoritarian governments, particularly 
in occupying political power. 
Since the primary goal of regimes, democratic or authoritarian, is to stay in 
office, they try to reduce taxes as much as they can because this is one of the most 
effective ways to gain support from their electorates. Ross (2012) studies this 
phenomenon in the context of political budget cycles. Especially for authoritarian 
regimes, decreasing budget dependence on tax revenues can be an effective survival 
strategy as taxation provokes accountability, and such accountability can translate into 
the claim of political rights, which then can evolve into movements for democracy. 
Nevertheless, the massive exogenous oil income has freed the AGCs’ governments from 
taxation and, thus, accountabilities. Once governments escape such accountabilities, 
they can tame democratization and prolong their authoritarian regime. The AGCs, 
therefore, maintain such unique state revenue characters as the absence of taxation. 
In Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman, tax revenues, including taxes imposed on 
companies and international trade, account for less than 1% of the total government 
revenue in each country (Table 2). According to IMF, in Qatar, the amount of corporate 
tax revenue, excluding oil and gas companies, was QR 14.5 billion or 9.3% of the total 
revenue in 2010/11. Similarly, IMF reports that in Saudi Arabia, non-oil corporate tax 
revenue comprised only 0.9 % of the total revenue in 2010. 
                                                 
2 Irrespective of elections being held, the ruling families mainly constitute the AGCs’ 
governments. Only the monarch (king, emir, or sultan) can nominate a prime minister, 
who then appoints the cabinet members from the ruling family who are not parliament 
members. Hence, the elections do not serve as a mechanism that can change the 
government. 
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Enterprises, as a source of tax revenues, are not as important as in 
tax-dependent countries; thus, the AGCs’ governments seem to disregard them when 
framing policies. However, enterprise owners, especially those of large-scale companies, 
are sometimes part of royal families who supposedly influence, to a certain extent, the 
government’s decision. More importantly, the governments themselves need their 
support to stabilize the dynastic monarchy3 (Peterson 2007). Given these conditions, 
the influence of enterprises should be assessed not only by their contribution to the 
economy and state budget, but also as a component of royal families. This also means 
that the influence of enterprises varies by each AGC. 
Labor is one of the main actors in democratic countries; however, in the 
AGCs, they are the least protected and empowered. Labor is divided into national and 
migrant workers and the share of the latter exceeds that of the former. Even though the 
workforce in the AGCs primarily composes of migrant workers, the kafala system4 
illegally tethers them to their sponsors and deprives them of their rights. Undoubtedly, 
migrant workers are vulnerable given their low wages in comparison to national 
workers (Table 3) and are less integrated in host societies. Ironically, their vulnerability 
creates price competitiveness. Migrant workers are preferred by not only enterprises as 
they can be hired at low costs, as opposed to national workers, but also governments 
because they can be easily deported in the case of labor problems. 
By contrast, national workers have a weak market. Since their expected wage 
is much higher than that of migrant workers—owing to the economic differentials 
between the less developed sending countries and the oil-rich countries, and 
well-established social welfare—national workers have less price competitiveness. In 
addition to these factors, national workers cannot change their status politically, given 
                                                 
3 Field (1985) and Carter (1979; 1984) studied in detail about the historical relations 
between ruling families and merchants in the Gulf. According to Peterson (2007), 
functions of them were clear until the beginning of the oil era; rulers were in charge of 
politics and merchants were of commerce and the formers protected the latters and the 
latters provided the formers capitals. After the oil era, the relation changed as some 
ruling family members started their businesses, however, some merchants has affected 
government through joining the government as ministers or high ranking officials. 
4 The term kafala derives from Arabic word “kafil” or a sponsor. Under this system, 
migrant workers cannot change their job without consents of kafils who take passports 
away from migrants and kafils have discretions to cancel and extend work contracts. 
See Khalaf and Alkobaisi (1999); Baldwin-Edwards (2011). In many AGCs kafala is 
not official system. In Oman and Bahrain it was abolished as discussed in this paper and 
under consideration of the abolition in Kuwait and the UAE. 
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their exclusion from political processes, or participate in trade unions since they are 
rendered inactivate by the governments5. Furthermore, the share of national workers in 
the total work force is so small that they are incapable of creating effective movements 
to voice their demands, which consequently, are often neglected by the governments 
and enterprises.  
These circumstances create competition between the two groups of workers, 
leading to widespread criticism of the governments by the citizens. Thus, governments 
must tackle labor and migrant issues to keep their authoritarian regimes alive. 
 
Options to labor market issues 
The AGCs’ governments have the following four options that can help settle 
migrant issues:  
A. National division of labor 
B. Quota system 
C. Reduction of the price competitiveness gap between national and migrant 
workers 
D. Redistribution of profits generated by importing migrant workers 
 
Option A: National division of labor 
It is well known that in some migrant-receiving countries, there are ethnic or 
racial divisions of labor. These ethnic or racial divisions can be defined as the allocation 
of jobs in a specific industry or occupation to specific ethnic (or racial) groups. It also 
means that workers from ethnic or racial minorities are assigned to industries in which 
majorities prefer not to participate and, as a result, are restricted in their jobs or 
occupations despite de jure or de facto. However, in the AGCs, labor is not divided 
along ethnic lines but on the basis of whether they are national or migrant workers; this 
phenomenon can be more accurately referred to as the national division of labor. In the 
AGCs as well, the number of migrant workers far exceeds that of nationals, making it is 
impossible to restrict them. To tackle this issue, governments impose citizen-priority 
employment systems in specific fields. However, because enterprises prefer cheaper 
labor to reduce costs, it is difficult to achieve positive results in the national division of 
labor in the private sector. The governments of the AGCs enacted laws that obligates 
                                                 
5 Cammett and Posusney (2010) reports that during the first decade of 2000s labor 
codes are revised and even migrant workers were allowed to join unions. However, all 
labor unions are inactive and no labor dispute was reported in these decades. 
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private enterprises to hire nationals prior to migrants, however, these are ignored. Thus, 
the national division of labor could be implemented only in the public sector. 
 
Option B: Quota system 
The split labor market divides the market into groups and allows the payment 
of different wages (Bonacich 1972; 1976). E. Bonacich, who originally proposed the 
split labor market theory to elucidate the US labor market conditions in the late 19th 
century—when the Blacks were legally allowed to enter the labor market, subsequently 
causing the market to split between Whites and Blacks workers—explained how this 
system was despaired. Bonacich focused on three actors: (1) enterprises that tried to hire 
cheap Black workers and decrease wages for White workers to reduce costs and 
eventually, abolish this system (2) White workers who wanted to maintain the split 
labor market to protect themselves, and (3) the government that has to weigh the power 
of the White workers against the enterprises and then decide whether to enact this type 
of market. She concluded that only when the White workers’ power is stronger than the 
enterprises would the government enact the split labor market. However, this was rarely 
the case because strikes by White workers, which were the only tactic they could use, 
were easily broken through means of strikebreaking. As a result, the split labor market 
was dissolved. 
Bonacich’s model can be applied with some modifications. First, in this study, 
groups are differentiated not by race, but by nationalities. Group A consists of the 
AGCs’ national workers, group B comprises workers from less developed country such 
as India, and group C has workers from lesser developed country such as Bangladesh. 
Group A receives much higher wages than those in group B, and group C earns the least 
wages. In this case, most migrant workers try to maintain the split labor market within 
migrants, fearing that dissolving of that will cause decreasing their wage. Since they are 
not concerned with the wage decrease of national workers, they do not try to implement 
the system between nationals and migrants. Second, national workers have much less 
power than the White workers of Bonacich’s model and, as mentioned, sometimes the 
owners of large-scale companies are members of ruling families and may be one of the 
factors proving detrimental to the split labor market. Hence, in the AGCs, expensive 
national workers are easily substituted by migrant workers split labor market.  
Maintenance of the split labor market warrants strong government 
interventions; one of them is the implementation of a quota system. The quota system 
obligates enterprises to hire national workers, who in turn demand much higher wages. 
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To this effect, some studies identify a quota system as a form of taxation (Hertog 2014); 
however, this is not entirely correct. It is true that the quota system is a type of taxation 
for enterprises because they are forced to contribute a certain amount of their profits to 
the social welfare of nationals. On the other hand, this is not the case for governments 
because they do not collect and redistribute taxes, and therefore, are not subject to 
accountability. Thus, the quota system allows the governments to not only escape the 
cost of redistributing enterprise profits but also benefit from the redistribution. This fits 
the AGCs’ condition to secure financial sources that are independent of tax revenue and 
possibly escape accountability to tax payers. 
 
Option C: Reduction of the price competitiveness gap between national and 
migrant workers 
In addition to the national division of labor and quota system, reducing the 
price competitiveness gap between national and migrant workers can solve, or at least 
ease, competition. Theoretically, this can be realized by increasing national workers’ 
price competitiveness or decreasing that of migrants, separately or simultaneously. 
However, increasing the price competitiveness of national workers is unrealistic 
because it requires that their wages be decreased. Further, certain national workers 
choose voluntary unemployment and become eligible for unemployment benefits, 
which then increases government expenditure. This only negatively impacts the budget 
burden, unemployment, and opposition from national workers. In addition, it may raise 
criticisms against the governments and instigate anti-government movements.  
By contrast, the cost of decreasing migrant competitiveness is borne not by 
the governments but by enterprises since it would include increasing the cost of hiring 
migrants, raising visa fees, charging enterprises with a “hiring migrant fee” per migrant 
worker, and abolishing the kafala system to promote the mobility of migrant workers 
(Hertog 2014). Hence, option C can be implemented by decreasing the price 
competitiveness of migrant workers. 
 
Option D: Redistribution of profits generated by importing migrant workers 
Generally, governments depend on the redistribution of profits from importing 
migrants for their tax revenue. Borjas (1995) shows that a decrease in workers’ wages in 
a receiving country, because of an influx of low-wage migrant workers, generates 
profits for enterprises, leading to an increase in the governments’ tax revenue. 
Governments then redistribute this newly generated revenue to national workers who 
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are faced with wage reduction. However, this is not possible in the AGCs because they 
collect little tax from their national economy, and thus, are unable to redistribute tax 
revenue.  
 
Governments’ preference of the four options: A >B > C > D 
It can be assumed that the preference of the AGCs’ governments is A > B > C 
> D. At first glance, this preference seems to be irrational because it means that the 
governments prefer less economical measure. For example, under option A, 
governments must hire national workers and continue to pay wages regardless of oil 
reserves and prices, which eventually will increase the budget burden. Thus, 
governments should avoid implementing it. 
Option B will generate ghost employees, especially in industries that are 
neither prestigious nor favorable for national workers, such as constructions, services, 
and wholesales. In these industries, to meet the quota system, enterprises must hire 
national workers regardless of their merits and pay them wages independent of their 
actual working hours and efficiency. Thus, it is often the case that national workers earn 
wages without doing much work and reporting for a mere few hours, once or twice a 
week. Although this is not seriously harmful for enterprises, because they can absorb 
such wasted costs by decreasing the wage of migrant workers, it can prove detrimental 
for overall economy in terms of national workers’ limited acquisition of skills and 
inability to produce added value. The quota system may solve the unemployment 
problem of national workers; however, at the same time, it can be harmful in that it 
hinders the governments’ realization of the fundamental goal of nationalizing its 
workforce and increasing national productivity in preparation for the future of an 
oil-independent economy. 
Why and how does this preference emerge? When governments are 
authoritarian in nature, they try as much as possible to reduce tax dependence and 
concessions for national workers and enterprises. This makes it impossible to 
redistribute profits, although they can distribute oil revenue. Enterprises prefer to hire 
cheap migrant workers to expensive national workers who have less price 
competitiveness and are less empowered. Migrant workers are also less politically 
empowered but retain price competitiveness. Under these circumstances, the emergence 
of this preference is explained as follows. 
 
A > B: No cost except budget costs for the government 
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The choice of the national division of labor is not economically rational, as 
mentioned above. On the other hand, when the government chooses option B, national 
workers’ wages are paid by enterprises. Then, why do the AGCs’ governments prefer 
option A to B? 
The factor that affects this choice is typical to the AGCs. It is rational for 
governments to prefer option A to B because to implement option A governments 
require only a financial base, whereas option B warrants concessions to enterprises. 
Enterprises that are obligated to hire expensive national workers will refuse to do so 
unless they receive a concession. On the other hand, the AGCs’ authoritarian 
governments that strive to occupy their political power avoid granting such concessions. 
Thus, the governments have less incentive to implement a quota system than the 
national division of labor.  
Since enterprises prioritize their business over budget affairs, they neither 
object to the national division of labor nor willingly promote the quota system. In 
addition, national workers prefer A to B because they want a more stable and higher 
paying occupation. As a result, the AGCs’ prefer A to B. 
 
B > C: Cost of concession 
Governments incur less cost to achieve C rather than B because they do not 
bear the costs of visa fees or hiring migrants. However, this does not mean that a 
government will always introduce C more easily than B. The reason is almost the same 
as that discussed for option B. 
In comparison to B, it may be more difficult for enterprises to implement C 
because they bear certain costs, considering the number of migrants is much higher than 
that of national workers. Thus, as long as enterprises bear the cost, governments must 
concession to them. In addition, the governments may sometimes work in the interest of 
enterprises when they are owned by royal family members. 
 
C > D: Impossible 
Option D is the least possible because the AGCs’ governments have to escape 
fiscal democracy and in fact, they do not collect taxes. It is worth mentioning that this 
lack of taxation does not mean that the AGCs’ governments are unable of collecting 
taxes. Some studies argue that the authoritarian governments of oil-exporting countries 
lose their capacity to collect taxes and they heavily depend on non-tax revenue and thus, 
tend to miss signs of an anti-government movement, until the matters become serious, 
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because such governments have no ability to collect information useful to identify signs 
of anti-government movements such as income, family size, and occupation, which 
were once drawn from data collected along with taxes (Smith 2007; Chaudhry 1997). 
Nevertheless, social security systems are now well organized and functional 
in the AGCs. Using this system, the governments collect the abovementioned 
information from national workers whose employers must register them as subscribers 
of social security. Thus, the governments retain the ability of taxation but do not use it. 
 
3. Analysis 
 
Preference of A > B  
At first, the AGCs’ governments implement option A. Fig. 1 shows changes in 
the national division of labor (share of national workers employed in the public sector) 
in the AGCs, excluding the UAE because it does not disclose details of national workers. 
From the 1960s to 1970s, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are almost on the same track. In 
1980, when the oil prices drastically dropped, the value for Saudi Arabia declines and 
since then till the 1990s, it is shown to recover. However, after the 1990s, the share of 
national workers in Saudi Arabia does not recover; instead in 2010, it plunges to a value 
less than that in the 1970s. The share of national workers in Oman is also shown to 
decline since 1990, for when data were available. As for Kuwait and Qatar, data from 
1985 to 2010 are almost identical and maintain high rates. Bahrain also shows an 
increase in share from 1970 to 1990; however, during this period, it reported slow 
growth, after which it has not increased. 
The AGCs can be classified into two groups, high- (Kuwait and Qatar) and 
low- division countries (Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia) on the basis of financial 
strengths. In the low-division countries, the share of public sector wages in the 
government budget consistently grew and in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, it was more 
than 40% after 2000. On the other hand, in the high-division countries, the highest share 
of public sector wages was about 40% in Qatar and 36% in Kuwait and after the 1990s, 
it further decreased to 17% and 22%. In addition, the low-division countries 
continuously recorded deficits during the 80s and the 90s6, whereas high-division 
countries generated surplus, with the exception of Kuwait during the 1990s, when it was 
being reconstructed after the Gulf War (see Fig. 2). 
                                                 
6 In 2005, Saudi Arabia recorded a huge surplus, however, this will be dissolved due to 
a slump of the oil price since late 2014. 
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This trajectory also explains why the governments of Kuwait and Qatar do not 
implement a cogent quota system: it appears to be a matter of necessity. The 
governments of Kuwait and Qatar do not need to implement the policy strictly to create 
jobs in the private sector. For these governments, such policies are simply palliative 
measures to tame the immediate dissatisfactions of the citizens, such as temporary 
inflations or economic depressions. Thus, the “failures” of a quota system in the private 
sector are not actual failures. This is not proof of the governments’ inability but of their 
strength to maintain the national division of labor. 
These facts elucidate that the AGCs’ governments implement a national 
division of labor as long as their budgets allow it, and when their budgets cannot sustain 
this policy, the division weakens, and consequently, the policies need to be changed. 
 
Preference of B > C 
According to Hertog (2014), many governments are now trying to implement 
“‘second generation’ of labor policies, which are based on market incentives.” For 
example, the government in Oman abolished the kafala system. This improved the 
mobility of migrant workers and diminished their competitiveness because now it is 
relatively easy for them to change jobs and thus, employers must improve their working 
conditions, such as wage and working hours, to ensure that they do not leave. A positive 
outcome confirmed as a result of this policy is an increase in national workers in the 
private sector. Similarly, the government in Bahrain abolished the kafala system and 
implemented measures to diminish the competitiveness of migrants, such as increasing 
the fees for a working visa to BD 200 (US $530) per head and imposing a cost of BD 10 
per hired migrant every month on employers (Hertog 2014). However, these 
second-generation policies seemed to be unsuccessful. According to my hypothesis, 
governments should prefer B to C. However, why did the governments in Oman and 
Bahrain implement C not B? In addition, why did option C fail in spite of its success 
before 2011? We discuss these questions in the following section. 
The only effective alternative to A at present is nitaqat, option B. Nitaqat is a 
system implemented in Saudi Arabia since 2011 for the purpose to decrease promote 
nationalization of the workforce by combining quota system and raising minimum wage 
of national workers. Some studies have questioned the effects of nitaqat by referring to 
similar policies being implemented by the Saudi government in vein; however, there is 
evidence in statistical data that indicates positive effects. 
Within a decade, the Saudi labor force increased almost two times, from about 
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5.3 million in 2004 to 11 million in 2013. The growth of the labor force in the private 
sector was almost identical (from 4.5 million to 9.7 million) (Fig. 3). However, during 
2009–2010, the growth rate of labor force was stagnant due to global financial crisis. 
This significantly affected the national workers in Saudi’s private sector more than it did 
the migrants. The number of Saudi national workers in the private sector decreased by 
nearly 18%, while that of migrant workers marginally increased. In addition, in the 
public sector, the number of Saudi national workers grew at the same pace as that before 
the crisis. 
These changes in the Saudi labor force can be attributed to the wage cut in the 
private sector. Fig. 4 shows that, in this stagnant period, the average wage in the private 
sector plunged by 35%. This change clearly demonstrates the vulnerability of the 
workers in Saudi Arabia—that is, in the case of a shrinking economy, it is the national 
workers who lose their jobs and not the migrants. Because they come from 
comparatively less developed countries than Saudi Arabia, migrants are less affected by 
wage cuts, as their income would still be higher than that in their home countries. Saudi 
nationals, on the contrary, who were already suffering from the pressure of decreasing 
wages owing to the influx of low-wage migrants, struggled with the wages that were 
lower than the expected level, and eventually, gave up their jobs and chose to be 
unemployed. Soon after the crisis, the average wage rate recovered and Saudi’s national 
workers returned to their jobs. By 2012, they reported a growth rate as that before the 
crisis, which then exceeded the expected level in 2013. This upward movement was a 
result of nitaqat, which includes the revision of the minimum wage to SR 3,000. 
Table 4 shows the positive effects of nitaqat on the employment rate of 
Saudi’s national workers. To confirm the effects, we compare the growth rates of private 
sector workers for 2004–2013 between the pre-nitaqat (2004–2008) and post-nitaqat 
period (2011–2013) and focus on three occupations in which the national workers were 
concentrated the most: manufacturing, construction, and wholesale and retail trade. To 
control for exceptional economic fluctuation, the crisis period (2009–2010) is excluded. 
The aggregated (Saudi nationals and migrants) effects of nitaqat in each category are 
not significant, except in the wholesale and retail industry, although when we compare 
effects between the Saudi nationals and migrants, the significance is clear. For example, 
in the manufacturing and construction industries, the differences in growth rates of the 
Saudi nationals between the two periods are 8.4 and 15, while that of migrants are −2.9 
and −0.9. In addition, in the private sector, the growth rate of Saudi national workers 
changed 10.3 points, while that of migrants was −0.8. This means that nitaqat 
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exclusively affected Saudi’s national workers. In the wholesale and retail industry, 
nitaqat affected both Saudi nationals and migrants; this is probably because of the 
industry’s growth rate as a whole.  
This raises the two questions. Why did only nitaqat have a positive outcome? 
If it can bear positive results, why did Saudi Arabia not implement nitaqat until 2011? 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Why did Oman and Bahrain implement option C and Saudi Arabia option B?  
The reason Oman and Bahrain could implement more economical measures 
lies in their labor markets. First, Saudi Arabia has the lowest share of national workers 
in the private sector (Table 5); hence, it is easier to implement B in Saudi Arabia than in 
Bahrain and Oman. Second, the wage gap between the national and migrant workers in 
Saudi Arabia is the widest among the three countries (Table 3). Again, increasing 
migrant costs (i.e., option C) is more expensive in Saudi Arabia than in Oman and 
Bahrain. It is not as difficult to implement option C in Oman and Bahrain as compared 
to Saudi Arabia. 
Third, the governments are characteristically different. As discussed, when a 
government tries to implement option C, it needs to provide more concessions to 
enterprises that object option C stronger than option B. In addition, it must also consider 
family members who own enterprises. If a ruler has greater political power and can 
maintain distance from such family members, so far as such impediments decrease 
effects to a degree that he can choose C at least as equally as B, he may chose C not B. 
In this respect, Oman is more an absolute monarchy and its ruler would be less 
cooperative with the ruling families than any other countries in the AGCs (Valeri 2013). 
On the other hand, in Bahrain, following the enthronement of the new king, a new 
constitution was approved through a referendum. Encouraged by the expectations from 
the reform, King Hamad introduced an innovative labor system that included the 
establishment of the Labor Market Regulation Authority in 2006 and a decrease in price 
competitiveness of migrant workers, that is, option C. However, soon after, conflicts 
emerged within the ruling elites and Hamad gradually lost his influence within the 
government. Finally, the regulations were abolished with the backing of Khalifa, the 
prime minister and the head of old guards. Saudi Arabia, which is not an absolute 
monarchy as Oman, is more a dynastic monarchy and is not undergoing a period of 
reformation like Bahrain. 
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Why did Saudi Arabia not implement effective measures until 2011? 
The issue of unemployment in Saudi Arabia, caused by competition between 
national and migrant workers, has been an important one since the mid-1980s; for 
example, the term “Saudization” officially appeared as one of objectives in the fourth 
development plan (1985–1990) (Ministry of Planning (Saudi Arabia) 1985). The Saudi 
Arabian government, however, could not achieve this goal and provided its reasons in 
the fifth development plan: 
 
The achievement of Saudiization (sic) in the private sector depends upon the 
extent to which employers’ perceptions are positive with respect to the quality 
of Saudi new entrants. At the same time, it remains true that these perceptions 
may be influenced by easy access to cheaper and more experienced non-Saudi 
workers. While this provides a competitive advantage for employers, and 
therefore, has a positive effect on the process of diversification, it can become 
an impediment to the employment of Saudi nationals if the issue if left 
entirely to market forces for its solution (Ministry of Planning (Saudi Arabia) 
1990). 
 
In reality, as the development plan reports, the employment of Saudi nationals was “left 
entirely to market forces” for almost a quarter of a century. 
From the mid-1980s, when the unemployment of nationals was officially 
noticed as a problem, to 2011, when nitaqat was implemented, several critical issues 
jolted Saudi Arabia, such as the Gulf War in 1990, the Iraqi War in 2003, and the 
financial crisis of 2008; however, all these incidents did not push it to implement 
effective alternatives to option A. Considering such historical courses, the only incident 
that appeared to have changed the situation is the so-called “the Arab Spring.” 
The Arab Spring spread throughout the region as rapid as a forest fire and the 
fear of regime change or political and economic disorders the Arab Spring brought to 
Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt were gradually being felt in the Gulf and finally, ignited 
Bahrain, where anti-governmental protests broke out and several people were killed, 
injured, and arrested. As the main body of the Gulf Shield Forces, the Saudi government 
dispatched its forces to Bahrain to contain the movements. At the time, the Saudi 
government stipulated that all enterprises agree to implement the quota system. The 
kind of concession offered to the enterprises remains uncertain, although it is obvious 
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that the enterprises accepted to incur costs of introducing the new system to prevent 
protests and protect their properties and collaborative relationship with the government. 
Thus, it was not until the grave fear of a crisis, such as the Arab Spring, that both the 
Saudi government and enterprises came to agree on the quota system. 
 
Why did C fail and B succeed? Another effect of the Arab Spring 
The Arab Spring is also the primary reason underpinning the failure of the 
Oman and Bahrain’s labor-migrant reform. In Oman, as mentioned above, the abolition 
of kafala system produced positive results, although according to Hertog (2014), in 
2011, the Omani government decided to raise the minimum wage of national workers in 
response to protests against the government, which occurred as a result of the Arab 
Spring; this decision decreased their price competitiveness. In Bahrain, for the same 
reasons, the government created 20,000 new public jobs and decreased the monthly fee 
of BD 10 per migrant workers to BD 5. In addition, to create a coalition between the 
government and enterprises, it introduced new a regulation that prohibits migrant 
workers from changing their job within a year of joining. As a result, the price 
competitiveness of migrant workers was restored, and matters went back to square one. 
On the other hand, the nitaqat system was more effective. It protected 
national workers by raising their minimum wage and introducing a quota system and 
provided functions to penalize companies that could not effectively meet the conditions. 
Raising national workers’ minimum wage and decreasing migrant workers’ price 
competitiveness can be futile when both policies are implemented at the same time, 
because the former is a type of market intervention and the latter a form of market 
opening; in other words, they will offset each other. While the Omani and Bahraini 
governments refused to advance policies on the basis of market mechanisms in response 
to the Arab Spring and failed to reform the labor market, the Saudi government did not 
rely on such mechanisms and instead chose intervention. 
The Saudi government implemented nitaqat using the social security and visa 
application systems for migrant workers. The social security system helps the Saudi 
government with information on national workers, such as wages and occupations, and 
the visa system managed by the Ministry of Interior provides information on the 
number of migrant workers each company is hiring (at least legally). The government 
can also implement a nitaqat system that categorizes companies by share of national 
workers in the total number of employees, without relying on information supplied by 
the companies because it may be not always be correct, and impose penalties on such 
16 
companies that do not meet conditions under nitaqat by restricting the number of visas 
they issue to migrant workers, which is controlled by the Ministry of Interior. 
Furthermore, each company should disclose every year to the public progress made 
owing to nitaqat, which also allows nationals to identify which company tends to hire 
more migrant workers. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study analyzed the AGCs’ labor policy preferences and tested the 
hypothesis that their preference can be defined as A > B > C > D, and almost confirmed 
it. The only preference that is not distinguishable is B > C because a government can 
choose C if the circumstances allow it. 
The economic dependence on oil and the authoritarian natures of the 
governments explain the formation of this preference. When the growth of the national 
economy exceeds the proportion of the national workers because of the influx of 
exogenous profits from oil exports, this leads to labor market problem such as labor 
shortage and the subsequent importation of migrant workers. The most economical, 
market-based policy that can solve this problem is the redistribution of profits generated 
by importing cheap labor to national workers subject to low wages, given the growing 
number of migrants. However, authoritarian governments may refrain from such 
measures as they do collect taxes and fear the emergence of a financial democracy. Thus, 
the governments will implement policies that have distortionary effects on the labor 
market. 
The governments in the AGCs, at first, preferred the worst economical 
method: hire national workers in the private sector. Although this increased the budget 
burden, but does not require any concession to any actors instead. As long as the 
financial strength can support this policy, the governments will try to maintain it. This 
explains why in Kuwait and Qatar, alternative labor policies such as the quota system 
did not bear fruit: these governments did not need to pay costs necessary to achieve 
positive results. In addition, alternatives that can be implemented vary by the nature of 
the government and labor market. If the ruler is more independent from the actors in 
political processes, he can implement alternatives with more concessions and if the 
wage difference between the national and migrant workers is smaller, he can implement 
more market-friendly measures. If not, he is subject to pressure from the national 
workers and will repeatedly adopt palliate measures, until the point where national 
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workers nearly boil over, which eventually leaves the government and enterprises with 
no choice but to agree on effective alternative policies. 
To retain its authoritarianism and solve labor market problems, the 
governments must rationally choose less economical options. This means that 
implementing irrational economical measures does not reflect the inability of these 
governments. As is the case of taxation, the governments can implement more 
economical policies but authoritarianism does not allow it. However, occasionally, if 
conditions permit, the governments may implement more market-friendly measures like 
in Oman and Bahrain (C > B). Such measures that reduce the budget burden must be 
more sustainable, although authoritarian governments cannot continue with this policy 
in the face of stormy anti-government movements. Since, in the AGCs, there is no arena 
(e.g., trade unions and elections) or parliaments where rulers, citizens, and enterprises 
can reach a consensus, it is only the governments that can, and must, resolve conflicts 
between the actors. In this case, market interventions are the only viable option for 
governments to diffuse movements or protests. While this does not achieve the 
long-term goal of increasing the productivity of national workers, it is rational measure 
that will allow the governments of the AGCs to live longer. 
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Table 1 
Population and Work Force (%), 2005-2010 
 Population (%) Work Force (%) 
 Nationals Migrants Nationals Migrants 
Bahrain (2010) 46.04 53.96 25.20 74.80 
Kuwait (2011) 35.55 64.45 15.06 84.94 
Oman (2010) 70.57 29.43 24.50 75.50 
Qatar (2010) 25.40 74.60 6.60 93.94 
Saudi Arabia (2010) 68.84 31.16 20.57 79.43 
UAE (2005) 20.10 79.90 20.24 79.76 
Source: Central Informatics Organisation (Bahrain)(n.d.); Idāra al-ta‘dād wa al-iḥsā’āt al-sukkānīya 
(al-Kuwayt)(n.d.); Idāra al-ta‘dād (Sulṭana ‘Umān)(n.d.); World Bank (2015); Ministry of 
Development Planning and Statistics (Qatar) (n.d.); Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (2012); National 
Bureau of Statistics (UAE) (n.d.). 
Note: Because Qatar government does not disclose number of population by nationals and migrants 
except work force, values of populations of Qatar are from World Bank (2015). 
 
Table 2 
Dependence on Tax Revenue (%), 2008-2012 
Bahrain  0.67 (2011) 
Kuwait  0.58 (2008) 
Oman  0.81 (2012) 
Qatar  9.0 (2010/11) 
Saudi Arabia  0.9 (2010) 
OECD 23.72 (2012) 
World 21.74 (2012) 
Source: Values of Qatar and Saudi Arabia are calculated 
from data of IMF (2014); rest of them are from data of 
World Bank (2015). 
 
Table 3 
Average Wages and Differences in the Private Sector 
 Nationals (a) Migrants (b) Difference (a/b) 
Bahrain (BD) (2010) 677 210 3.22 
Oman (OR) (2007/08) 476.4 254.3 1.87 
Saudi Arabia (SR) (2012) 4801.43 940.16 5.11 
Source: Labour Market Regulatory Authority (n.d.); al-Mudīrīya al-‘Āmma lil-Iḥsā’āt 
al-Ijtimā‘īya (2010); Wizāra al-‘Amal, al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabīya al-Su‘ūdīya (2012). 
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Table 4 
Effects of nitaqat 
Industries  
Growth Rate (%) Diff. 
(2005-2008) (2011-2013)  
Manufacturing 
industries 
Nationals 21.6 29.9 8.4 
Migrants 5.7 2.9 -2.9 
Total 7.6 6.8 -0.9 
Construction and 
building 
Nationals 23.3 38.4 15.0 
Migrants 14.3 13.5 -0.9 
Total 15.0 15.4 0.4 
Wholesale and 
retail trade 
Nationals 25.2 35.5 10.4 
Migrants 2.8 9.9 7.1 
Total 5.3 13.6 8.2 
Total Private labor 
force 
Nationals 21.2 31.8 10.3 
Migrants 9.6 8.8 -0.8 
Total 10.9 11.5 0.6 
Source: Calculated from data in Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (2013). 
 
Table 5 
Workers in the Private Sector, 2010 
 Nationals Migrants Share of Nationals (%) 
Bahrain (2010) 83,827 401,865 17.26 
Oman (2010) 177,716 955,630 15.68 
Saudi Arabia (2010)  724,655 6,266,545 10.37 
Source: Central Informatics Organisation (Bahrain) (n.d.); Idāra al-ta‘dād (Sulṭana ‘Umān) (n.d.); Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (2012). 
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